Call for Harmonization of U.S. Climate Change Legislation with Global Mechanisms
Written by Karla Bell on Monday, 23 February 2009
Carbonflow Policy Paper 1. Supporting the Principles of Cap and Trade, Harmonization / Global Linkages, Early Action / Offsets, Inclusion of Energy Efficiency and Land Use Credits, Enact and Learn. Carbonflow, Inc. is actively working on the development of rigorous and transparent systems for the reduction of costs and increase in abatement potentials under the global Kyoto based cap and trade and flexible mechanisms. We and the signers of this paper advocate for harmonization of US legislation, state, regional, and federal, with global carbon abatement mechanisms, as part of the solution to ensure high levels of actual, permanent, and verifiable abatement at a manageable and fairly distributed cost to the economy.
The emerging U.S position on legislation for global climate change in a comprehensive U.S. Cap and Trade system has been summarized to generally include the following agreement and discussions.[1] While we recognize these measures are subject to change and are in a fluid dialogue, it is useful to recognise the major points of debate:
1. Address carbon emission reductions by cap and trade, with a baseline year of 1990 in line with the international community.
2. Adopt a domestic Cap and Trade Climate Change bill that includes a ‘60-80′% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 on 1990 levels, and argue for similar deep cuts internationally under the Kyoto Mark II (to apply 2012-2017).1
3. Adopt interim targets in line with the European Commission new action targets for Kyoto Mark II adopted in December 2008, for a 20-40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020.[2]
4. Include more ‘aggressive auction schedules’ than those in the process followed during the first phase of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).
5. Ensure transparency, rigor, and mitigation of trade effects around the verification of CDM or other offset projects and criteria for “additionality” and/or limit their use, geography, and scope.[3]
6. Ensure cap and trade interacts with the domestic roll-out of national and local programmatic initiatives and performance-based rules.
7. Target offset use, domestic or international, around key carbon wedges of significant size and of criticality to significant local industries and constituencies.[4]
President Barack Obama has indicated he will pursue deep cuts in domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that he is prepared to argue for the same deep cuts in international emissions. The cleantech industry and the carbon market industry fully supports this intention. We expect that the international community will welcome U.S participation in the next round of talks on the Kyoto Mark II program to reduce global GHG emissions in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009.
We believe we can summarize the major objectives and constraints of most parties, albeit in varying degrees, as follows:
Objectives:
1. Meet the global IPCC goals for abatement in the long term
2. Catalyze fast action in the short term
3. Harness industry and private sector activity
4. Provide economic stimulus support and support local job growth
5. Quickly establish a clear, consistent, stable regulatory regime
6. Fit within broader environmental mandates
7. Minimize collateral damage to global and local economies and trade
8. Provide transparency and environmental rigor throughout the process
We have established a list of Principles for inclusion in US policies which we consider would support meeting these objectives:
Principle 1 Cap and Trade - The primary rationale for market mechanisms (and cap and trade in particular) is that this is the fastest way to squeeze carbon out of the economy to achieve long term abatement targets at the least cost. It is a carrot AND stick approach. It provides a middle ground between strict command and control and carbon tax. True command and control is difficult to implement in a multi-lateral global framework without significant economic collateral damage, and a carbon tax does not address the critical trade issues surrounding carbon nor ensure that abatement levels will actually be reached. Cap and trade has the capacity to harness vast amounts of investment and of committed people to address climate change in a very short time frame, without new direct taxes. Government can use auctioning of some or all emission permits as a means of generating revenue to pay for the system costs and invest in low carbon initiatives.
As described below, cap and trade has long been recognized as providing the most flexible mechanism to enact the command and control objective of ensuring abatement occurs, while simultaneously ensuring the correct pricing of carbon externalities at the least cost. While some economists have argued that theoretically a carbon tax would yield less economic loss to the economy, a more sober look shows that it would only be true in a single country model. Given the size and inherently global nature of carbon, the currency and trade impacts of pricing carbon through a tax or command and control would in practice mean a carbon tax would have to be completely integrated with global trade arrangements through the WTO in order to manage leakage issues It would likely cause a much higher degree of economic loss than cap and trade even then, once the mispricing of capital investment and rent seeking impacts of differing effective carbon tax rates in different industries and jurisdictions was taken into account.
It should be understood that auctioning a larger proportion of emission permits relative to those freely allocated does not necessarily mean a higher permit price or higher abatement levels. The actual abatement and prices are determined by abatement targets/allowances, the volume or auctioned permits, industry’s inventory reduction potential, and development potential of low carbon offset projects. Auctioning simply defines the general level of revenue collection to the government administering the cap. It should also be noted that we recognize that to the extent cap and trade is enacted with a high level of auction, cap and trade effectively functions as an indirect carbon tax, in the long run paid by consumers, on a variable rate and variable tax basis which automatically minimises the penalty on the most carbon friendly businesses in an industry.
Principle 2 Harmonization / Global Linkages - A significant risk in establishing cap and trade, or any type of large scale abatement mechanism, on a regional basis is that it a) can result in different and higher prices of carbon locally than in our trading partners and b) does not include large portions of global GDP and emissions, without which achieving global abatement goals is simply not possible. Harmonization of and linkages between individual schemes mitigates these effects to a large degree.
In fact, since the impact of increasing levels of atmospheric CO2 affects all global citizens, it is highly dangerous from an economic point of view to regulate carbon unilaterally either nationally or regionally, without harmonization with other regulations. One targeted effect of cap and trade schemes is to create a new cost in the industrial supply chain, pricing in the carbon externality. However, in a competitive global supply chain environment, higher local carbon prices without linkages to other schemes can have the effect of pushing production and jobs to lower carbon price regions, effectively pushing carbon offshore with no net reduction. Worse, unlinked markets without globally fungible offsets have the potential to push GDP activity to more carbon intensive regions (an example being pushing manufacturing production from California to China), leading to the worst case scenario of expensive domestic abatement, limited global abatement, and at the same time costing domestic production and jobs. Linkages effectively enable companies to purchase carbon costs from offshore jurisdictions, still paying the price of carbon, but having the option to keep jobs and production home.
A consistent and transparent market price for carbon can be achieved most cost effectively through a combination of policy harmonization targeting similar abatement levels across jurisdictions, and where abatement levels are lower, allowing linkages between those jurisdictions and schemes, based on globally fungible offsets.
Harmonization might be achieved through a range of options, including setting, either directly or indirectly, overall caps at levels similar to those of our key trading partners, or creating sectoral carbon intensity based targets that set relative levels for the most affected industries, or a combination. The challenge of achieving either policy outcome should not be underestimated, and will put pressure on global verification capabilities.
Linkages between schemes can be achieved by allowing a broader range of offsets (such as those from CDM or JI) or credits from other schemes to be used to achieve compliance with the emission cap. This can enable the price of carbon to achieve parity across geographies (including those not currently under an emission cap). During the early years of a scheme’s operation carbon prices can be both high and volatile, and linkages with mature schemes based on the free trading of carbon can provide an effective price and supply safety valve. This is an issue US companies are already facing from geographic and sectoral variances between caps under AB-32, WCI and RGGI.
At heart, the science tells us that carbon is a global problem, and that from the environment’s perspective it does not matter where in the world emission or abatement occur, just whether or not they do. We need our policies, whether they be local, state, regional, national, or multi-national, to reflect this fact.
Principle 3 Early Action / Offsets - In addition to a significant role in the elimination of greenhouse gases, offset projects and credits support the equalization of carbon prices, enhance employment security for high carbon cost geographies, provide a financing avenue for carbon abatement activities which may be critical given the current economic climate, and provide a path for early action by industry. They encourage employment in the nascent cleantech sector, encouragement which has been sorely lacking due to the uncertainties surrounding operational details of the proposed schemes. This would in turn obviate industries’ demand for a safety valve price, as offset credits can provide an additional source of permits in early commitment periods. Finally, offset projects provide a means by which developing nations can engage with schemes in the US. By financing the export of and investment in cleantech manufacturing and services (as with the CDM), the US can engage with its developing country trade partners, and provide an avenue to advance sectoral based carbon intensity targets and commitments in a phased approach, so bringing developing economies closer to full participation in cap and trade schemes.
Offset credits, rigorously validated and verified, provide the best mechanism for rapid and low cost linkages between markets to equalize carbon price and protect domestic production and jobs.
Early action and offset projects also provides an avenue to increase global verification capacity to adequate levels prior to later commitment periods, reducing overhead costs and providing additional cleantech employment. The regulation of carbon and Measurement & Verification is a cross border problem, and so must include a vastly greater number of regulation points to manage leakage than would be the case for a purely local environmental protection regime. International trade in goods faces similar issues, and in that case 3rd party verification has proven to be the least cost and most reliable path.
For these reasons it is essential that upcoming legislation includes the recognition of early action emission reductions and of their bankability for future compliance periods, and addresses a path for harmonization of standards for 3rd party verification.
Principle 4 Inclusion of Energy Efficiency and Land Use Credits in the U.S. Cap and Trade - The sectors making the largest contributions to global carbon emissions are driven by energy intensity (and thus carbon emissions) per unit of economic activity or the increase or decrease in the carbon sinks from land use, land use change and forestry. It is generally accepted that if energy intensity per unit of economic activity and the size of the major carbon sinks are moving against us, it may well be virtually impossible to meet abatement targets, no matter how stringent the caps on emitting sectors.
One major avenue for supporting reduced emission intensity in the energy driven sectors is to include demand-side energy efficiency projects with their resulting emission reduction credits in cap and trade schemes. The effect of double counting can be eliminated by adjusting the size of the cap, effectively by exchange of project based emission reduction credits for emission permits on a one to one basis. Energy efficiency projects have the added benefits of providing significant early action reductions, as well as anchoring a large part of the potential for growth in cleantech jobs. If programmatic and performance based rules are harmonized with the credit markets to address additionality issues, we may well be able to utilize the carbon credit markets to provide the financing necessary for changes in energy efficiency and land use activities, which are notoriously difficult and expensive behaviours to change.
Agriculture and land use constitute some of the largest sources of emissions, while at the same time providing huge opportunities for reductions. Current farming practices -driven by various government policies, subsidies and the industrialization of agriculture in the 20th century - are major contributors to global warming.[5] The EPA’s latest inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks[6] estimates that agriculture accounts for over 500 million tons of CO2-e per year, while land-use, land-use change and forestry capture over 880 million tons in carbon sinks.
Incentives provided by cap-and-trade should reward and accelerate the transformation towards lower-emissions farming and a more sustainable food chain. Soil management and soil carbon sequestration deserve particular attention due to the major impact they will have in adding large amounts of reductions to the current sink pool. Thus, it is essential to encourage and support the creation of rigorous protocols and verification methodologies which will jump-start these changes to farming practice. It is also essential that agriculture, land use and soil sequestration be included in upcoming legislation as legitimate sources of offsets, and that the regulations which impair sustainable agriculture be revised.
That being said, energy efficiency, agriculture, and land use abatement has proven to be one of the most difficult and costly on a per unit basis to reliably manage measurement & verification from a carbon perspective, and that issue must be addressed. The reality is that these sectors, given the relative inelasticity of demand in energy and food, and the stickiness in land pricing, have always been relatively difficult for policymakers as they attempt to drive consumer and business uptake in a cost effective manner. Including them in carbon offset and management systems represents the potential for a real breakthrough in driving activity, and so despite the complexities, we believe they must be included.
Principle 5 Enact and Learn - The final principle is that we must enact and learn. The change must be long term, measured, and deliberate. While we are all concerned with meeting long term goals and catalyzing fast action, that must be balanced with the need for change and abatement to be global, not just local or regional, and that the real constraint is that as a nation and a globe we only have so much GDP to spend on environmental action.
It is an oft forgotten fact in the discussion of the Kyoto experience that 1) the abatement levels reached have been primarily what we expected (albeit not as exceptionally high as many would like), 2) the price collapses in carbon are a prima facie case that industry met its commitments at lower costs than some had feared, 3) CDM has had a positive impact on job protection, and a moderating impact on carbon abatement costs in the developed world, and that 4) seemingly small design differences in the system and can have outsized impacts on economic activity, and so phasing of system design to allow policymakers to learn is of more importance than had previously been understood.
Given the ubiquitous nature of carbon - it touches all people, and the sheer magnitude of the problem - based on IPCC targets we are looking at policy prescriptions imposing costs as a percentage of GDP on a scale not seen globally since the Second World War, and so it is critical that the policy design allows each industry, policymakers and regulators time and the flexibility to adjust as we learn. Compared to our ideal rapid abatement scenarios, we would advocate bias in system designs towards 1) faster starting and less aggressive targets with higher prices on lower volumes in the early years as policymakers, industry, and regulators learn how much the industry can actually do, with 2) broader and more multi-lateral inclusion in the early days when volumes are low coupled with tighter verification requirements as volumes rise, with 3) rapidly escalating caps, more aggressive abatement targets and lower prices on higher abatement volumes in later years. This likely means a framework and principles approach to legislation, leaving regulators with greater rather than lesser flexibility, and is far superior to a prescriptive approach where the economic and trade impacts of early design flaws last for a significant period of time.
Again, we believe we can summarize the major objectives and constraints of most parties, albeit in varying degrees, as follows:
Objectives:
1. Meet the global IPCC goals for abatement in the long term
2. Catalyze fast action
3. Harness industry and private sector activity
4. Provide economic stimulus support and support local job growth
5. Quickly establish a clear, consistent, stable regulatory regime
6. Fit within broader environmental mandates
7. Minimize collateral damage to global and local economies and trade
8. Provide transparency and rigor throughout the process
With these objectives and principles, it is now time for action.
________________________
Neal Dikeman
________________________
Karla Bell
For more information contact: Neal Dikeman, CEO/Co-Founder: dikeman@carbonflow.com
Cell:1-415-336-2814 and Karla Bell CoFounder/Marketing Director karla.bell@carbonflow.com,
Cell: 1-415-307-5342, 660 3rd Street, San Francisco, CA 94107
[1] Richard Rosenzweig, Robert Youngman and Eric Nelson of Natsource writing in Point Carbon in an article titled “The Progress So Far”, December, 2008
[2] Brian Kenety, Third World Network, ” Europe sets new targets”
[3] The clean development mechanism (CDM) is one of the Kyoto protocol’s project-based flexible mechanisms that allows for carbon credits to be generated from emissions reduction projects in developing countries.
[4] Landfill methane use, Animal waste & wastewater methane use, Coal-mine methane; Agricultural and rangeland and sequestration and management projects; Land-use and forestry projects; Reduction of sulphur hexafluoride from electricity transmission equipment and other activities, were the activities targeted in the Lieberman-Warner proposal.
[5] Michael Pollan, “The Food Issue - An Open Letter to the Next Farmer in Chief, NY Times, Oct 12, 2008
[6] http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html

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